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Abstract 
As a number of scholars have shown, institutions played a central role in the breakups of 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union in the 1990s.  This paper builds on that work 
to explore in greater depth the variations across their experiences, including sub-cases within the 
former Yugoslavia, especially in the lens of violence accompanying the breakups.  It does so by 
examining these variables: whether the dismemberment was the result of dissolution or 
secession, whether it was elite or mass-driven and whether and how it was contested.  This paper 
finds that state dissolution produces more peaceful outcomes than the secession of a territory on 
the periphery.  Moreover, mass-driven separatism and unofficial contestation through the use of 
paramilitary forces increase the level of violence during a contentious state breakup.  The 
conceptual approach in the paper is therefore generalizable and will facilitate understanding of 
conflict around the world.    
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Introduction 
Across the world the number of new states increased dramatically throughout the twentieth 
century.  Two main factors contributed to this: the recognition of former colonial territories and 
the breakup of existing states.  Even in a continent with a longstanding tradition of state 
sovereignty such as Europe, significant changes to the Westphalian map occurred.  These 
breakups did not happen all at once but in two waves. 1  The first, running from the start of the 
twentieth century to the early 1920s brought the independence of Norway in 1905, Finland in 
1918, the post-Versailles states in 1919, and Eire (now the Republic of Ireland) in 1921.  
Removed in time, but similar in substance, was the emergence of an independent Iceland in 
1944.  A second wave of state proliferation occurred soon after the collapse of communism in 
1989.  Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union all broke apart, creating twenty-two 
new states by the start of 1993. 
 In light of such large-scale changes, it is not surprising that an immense amount of ink 
has been spilled in an attempt to explain how and why states break apart.  A smorgasbord of 
causes have been hypothesized, including ethnicity (both primordial and constructed), religion, 
language, power, culture, and social forces.2 
 The recent cases of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have illuminated a 
number of these forces and brought another to light: federal institutional structures.  Valerie 
Bunce (1999a, 199b, 2004) describes how these “subversive institutions” create “proto-states,” 
or “states in waiting,”3 which can emerge as full-blown states under the right circumstances.4  
Crucially, this explanation can make sense of the fact that the breakups took place along the 
lines of the largest political and geographical entities (union republics in the Soviet Union), 
rather than that of smaller entities (autonomous republics or regions).  After all, other potentially 
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secessionist regions such as Moravia in Czechoslovakia did not break away from the Czech 
Republic after the latter achieved independence despite some agitation for greater autonomy.5  
Similarly, Chechnya has not seceded from Russia.  Federalism may have existed only on paper 
in the Soviet era, but it heavily influenced the breakups of the Soviet bloc states. 
The story, however, is more complicated than that.  While the three states broke up along 
similar administrative lines, the processes that went on though varied in important- and 
systematic- ways.  This paper elucidates the differences and their implications; especially for 
whether breakups become violent or not.  Approached in this manner, the cases of 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, yield lessons applicable to the breakup of 
federations and quasi-federations elsewhere in the world.  Two important questions are raised in 
this paper.  Why were the breakups of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union 
different?  And why was there more violence in the case of Yugoslavia? 
 
Theoretical Developments 
In this paper there are three main areas of theory that are explored.  Essentially, three main 
points are made in order to bring out a fuller understanding of state breakups and the differing 
levels of violence across the cases.  These three points are then assembled into a typology to 
answer the above questions.  No single theory fits neatly here so a conglomeration of material is 
most useful to best explain the three central questions of this work.  However, there are three 
different theories that speak to each of the three main points.   
The title of this article, Beyond Subversive Institutions, is a reference to Valerie Bunce’s 
outstanding work that described the institutional nature of the breakups in Eastern Europe.  
Basically what this paper adds to the work of Bunce is a more complex definitional 
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understanding of secession.  By introducing the theoretical concept of dissolution as a way in 
which states can breakup, more can be explained.  Moreover, by describing Yugoslavia as a case 
of four secessions, this provides a greater explanation for the high level of violence in this case.    
 The nature of Bunce’s subversive institutions holds.  Her argument of regime collapse 
holds as well.  Quite simply, it was the dynamics between the center and the regions that 
ultimately caused the differences across the three cases.  Dissolution was an option in those 
cases.  Elites in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union opted to dissolve the states in the face of 
increasing secessionist demands.  The creation of a Greater Serbia was the larger goal in 
Yugoslavia which meant that elites in Yugoslavia attempted to control the state which led to 
greater secessionist hostility on the periphery.  The outcome was reduced to a zero-sum game.   
 A second area of interest for theory building is Migdal’s State-Society links.  Migdal 
argues that with high levels of social control, states can “mobilize their populations, skimming 
surpluses effectively from society and gaining tremendous strength in facing external foes.”6 
Internally, Migdal argues, state personnel can determine the rules of the society should be and 
they can carry out their preferences.  States can increase their level of social control in a scale of 
three indicators: compliance, participation, and legitimation.7 When elites are able to display 
social control over the population, the propensity for state breakups is minimal.   
 Migdal’s theory of social control fits well with the concepts in this paper.  On the one 
hand, a state with strong social control is able to dissolve the state without contestation.  The 
rules and norms set forth by political elites are accepted even if it means changing one of the 
primary identity’s for people in the state: their nationality.  On the other hand, a loss of social 
control speaks to the rise of separatist sentiments.  And in the case of Yugoslavia, there were 
multiple separatist sentiments.  The state lost social control over the territory which gave greater 
 5 
propensity for peripheral units to advocate secession.  When Milosevic attempted to assert 
control over the center, the rules of the game were not seen as legitimate, the regions did not 
comply, and there was a break in participation.   
 A third area of theory is Julie Mazzei’s Triad Model as an explanation for the emergence 
of paramilitary groups which caused significant levels of violence in the former Yugoslavia. 
Mazzei argues that a confluence of six conditions in which political elites, economic elites, and 
security forces join together to provide a sense of legitimacy and impunity; money, land, and 
supplies; and weapons and training, to the paramilitary group.8  The six conditions from which 
paramilitary emergence is likely to occur includes things like limited access to the political 
system, internal and external pressures from using too much violence, and an inability to deal 
with a reform movement.   
 Mazzei’s Triad Model is useful because it explains that outsourcing violence is a way in 
which states can undercut reform movements.  Moreover, when there are internal and external 
pressures against state from using violence, a paramilitary can be used to counter criticism and 
to increase violence.  Paramilitary groups may also exhibit more violent features than a standing 
military because there are more obvious ways to sanction official military personnel upon the 
cessation of conflict.   
 This paper adds a seventh possible explanation: cases of secessionism where ethnicity 
can be mobilized as a reason for subjugating a secessionist population.  The state is reluctant to 
use official modes of violence like the military for fear of outside intervention, but has the 
overarching goal of retaining national unity. 
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A Typology of State Dismemberment 
The typology, constructed in a four-by-three grid, lays out twelve ways in which a state may 
breakup (see Table One).1  In principle, the categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, 
and cases fit in only one cell of the table.  Reality, of course, is more complicated, but the table 
provides a basis for comparing cases in order to explain their relative levels of violence.  The 
table includes three categories of classification explained below: dissolution versus secession, 
elite versus mass-driven movements, and minimal contestation versus official and unofficial 
contestation.  
 Dissolution and Secession 
State dismemberment occurs in two ways, through dissolution and secession. While theoretically 
similar, some categorization shows how breakups have different trajectories which can influence 
levels of violence.  This categorization engages in a discussion of center-periphery relations; 
dissolution works in one direction whereas secession works in the opposite direction. 
Dissolution, by definition, means that the center dissolves entirely creating two or more 
brand new states.9  If we take the hypothetical example of state A, in a dissolution state A no 
longer exists; rather, it is replaced by states B and C (and, if necessary, states D, E and so on).10 
Secession, in contrast however, is the removal of a territory on the periphery of a state.  
This means that in our example, state A continues to exist after secession but is joined by state B 
(and, where applicable, by states C, D and so on).  State A diminishes in population, territory 
size and overall GDP but nonetheless continues to function as a legitimate and viable state.  
This delineation between dissolution and secession, despite the clear categorization laid 
out here, does have some nuances that are worth exploring further. MacCormick (2000), for 
                                                 
1 Some segments of the typology are not likely to happen in real life.  Yet for the purposes of an academic typology 
that is exhaustive, all segments need to be included.  For this reason, some boxes have been shaded so as to denote 
that they are theoretically possible but quite unlikely in real life.   
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example, may still haggle with my definition of dissolution even though his arguments largely 
align with the one proposed here.11  In his work, he is arguing that the cause of separatism in 
Scotland is not necessarily that of secession, the removal of a peripheral unit from the center.  
Rather, he is arguing for the dissolution of an agreed union, in this case the dissolution of the 
1707 Act of Union between Britain and Scotland.  The United Kingdom, however, came 
together through three major Acts of Union not just one (with Wales, Scotland and Ireland).12  
Dissolving the center, therefore, would require breaking all three Acts of Union just for the sake 
of Scotland.  It is unlikely then that the dissolution of the United Kingdom, as MacCormick 
argues, can be upheld because dissolution requires the removal of the center and the creation of 
four units in the specific case of the United Kingdom.  For the sake of Scotland alone dissolution 
cannot occur without the consent of Westminster.  Wales and Northern Ireland may be overruled 
in this hypothetical scenario, like the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union as discussed 
later, but Scotland will likely have to secede as a peripheral unit rather than through the 
consensual dissolution of the center.13  
 Elite versus Mass-led Movements 
Walker Connor (1990) argues that nationalism is a mass phenomenon.14  In many ways, this 
assertion is correct because every political movement requires at least some level of popular 
support.  Nationalism does not, contrary to popular opinion, require a majority of the population 
necessarily to support a movement before it profoundly changes a state (as Hitler’s electoral 
success in 1933 showcases) or leads to its breakup (as the case of Czechoslovakia will show 
later).  
Despite being a mass phenomenon, nationalism has to be driven from somewhere.  While 
this could, in theory, come from virtually anywhere, it can be broken down in one of two 
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trajectories, elite or mass-driven movements.  Stuart Kaufman (2001) delineates between elite 
and mass-driven separatist movements to show why this trajectory matters.  In his four cases, he 
argues that Moldova and, to some extent, Yugoslavia were elite driven whereas the Karabagh 
and Georgian conflicts were examples of mass driven movements.15  Likewise, in another 
example of mass-driven separatism, Giuliano (2006) describes how Russia managed to quell 
ethnic secessionist movements throughout the country that were supported from the bottom-up; 
or, as described in this paper, as mass-driven movements.16  These cases have significant 
implications since they infer that elite-driven movements are more likely to result in breakups.  
Moreover, there are other implications with regards to whether and how much violence will 
occur. 
An elite-driven movement, Kaufman argues, occurs when clear leaders emerge and ramp 
up their rhetoric against the other.  This is perhaps somewhat more controlled than a mass-driven 
movement because there is at least some level of accountability under international law, rather 
than simply the work of a rampant mob.  The international community sees the leader(s) of a 
given movement and can identify the source of increased animosity on the part of a group.   
 The masses, on the other hand, are motivated by fears of the other.  When a movement is 
mass-driven, the elites eventually come onboard as they did in Karabagh and Georgia.17  Elites 
support mass-driven movements once they had grown in size; basically, in an attempt to appeal 
to the electorate and save their own positions.  Kaufman’s myth-symbol complex is important 
here because people, especially the masses, respond to their own narratives and the narratives of 
the other.  A mass-driven movement, therefore, requires some activation of the masses as to their 
position relative to the other.  Violence often occurs at mass-driven rallies which are held in 
response to a larger political problem that is being demonstrated against.  It is, for this reason, 
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that elite versus mass-driven movements are important because mass-driven movements, at least 
theoretically, lead to more violence.  
The role of elites and the masses is important in the breakup of states given their 
propensity to cause violence. A mass-driven movement may simply descend a given state into 
anarchy whereby every man, woman or child has to fend for themselves or to somehow gather 
within their ethnic or religious group and pray for survival. 
One further nuance worth acknowledging is that all mass-driven movements do require 
some level of elite leading to come to fruition.  After all, people do not spontaneously show up 
on the streets to demonstrate; it requires some coordination.  The masses, however, can be 
coordinated from within and it is now conceivable to imagine, through text messaging, that mass 
driven movements could become easier as communication is facilitated by technological 
advances.  This was evident, for example, in the racial riots in and around Cronulla beach (near 
Sydney) between White and Middle Eastern (mainly Lebanese-Australian) youths in December 
of 2005. 
Levels of Contestation  
The level of contestation in a separatist conflict can help to explain the level of violence 
associated with the conflict.  Some conflicts are fought verbally and can be solved through non-
violent means.  Other conflicts, however, are contested through violent means. The level of 
violence in a conflict, though, is not uniform.  This can be very difficult to measure accurately, 
but at a minimum, we can categorize between official and unofficial contestation.  The typology, 
therefore, adopts three different categories of contestation: minimal, official and unofficial. 
 Minimal contestation occurs when the central government does not violently refute 
claims for separation.  This process, while non-violent, may be contested significantly through 
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verbal means but it does not utilize violence.  Contestation is minimal because the state breakups 
eventually and does so without violent contestation from the center.  Often there is an incentive 
from the international community; either through overt means like threats of military 
intervention from the UN or NATO, or covertly through the benefits of potential accession to a 
supranational organization like the EU.  
 Official contestation occurs when the center decides to utilize the military to defend its 
borders and to put down rebellion within the state.  The military has a uniform, a distinct ranking 
system and punishment when the soldiers violate the norms and procedures of war.  While the 
values and norms of the international community may not always be met, there is accountability, 
at least after the cessation of the conflict, because the leaders of the military are easily 
identifiable. 
 Unofficial contestations occur when the center loses its power over the military or said 
military is disbanded for some reason.  This means that in order to exert control within the state, 
the power to do so must be outsourced to paramilitary units who are capable of fulfilling the 
broad wishes of the center.  Paramilitaries have some distinct disadvantages as compared to an 
official military outfit like respect, history and money.  They, therefore, have to make up for 
these shortcomings which can be done through more ruthless and violent techniques as they are 
not explicitly bound to the rules and norms of international law.  Paramilitaries may have much 
less funding (and therefore may fall apart much more quickly) but this means that they will try to 
do more with less when presented with the opportunity.  This, in part, may be the lead cause as 
to why some conflicts are more violent than others. 
 A paramilitary may have the tacit support of the government, if not overt funding.  The 
problem with this, however, is that the center loses much of its control and authority over the 
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paramilitary group because it is difficult to admonish a loosely unified group.  Moreover, it is 
possible for the center to want a quick cessation to the conflict and not have the ability to stop 
the activities of the paramilitary group. 
 Contestation may be more likely when the population of a given territory is significantly 
heterogeneous, but this is not always the case.  Violence does break out in some regions whereas 
peace prevails in others.  Homogeneity, therefore, is not a prerequisite for conflict; only the use 
of official or unofficial contestation makes a real difference in the propensity for the use of 
violence and the degree to which violence occurs within a conflict.  
 ***PLEASE INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE*** 
 The Likelihood of the Segments in the Typology 
The typology helps to lay out important factors that occur in separatist conflicts.  Implications 
can then be drawn from these factors which are presented in a theoretical typology.  Reality, as 
always, is different from a theoretical typology and there are numerous factors that preclude the 
likelihood of any number of the boxes from being realized in the real world.  (The boxes in 
which the events are theoretically possible but very unlikely in real life are shaded in grey.)  It is, 
for example, difficult to imagine mass-driven dissolution because it would almost require a 
spontaneous street demonstration by a large number of people from all ethnic groups in the state 
(or at least two of them).  The masses would then have to remove the political elites, decide that 
the state was dissolving and then effectively declare independence for the two or more regions 
within the former country. 
 It is also hard to imagine official contestation in an elite-driven dissolution given the fact 
that the military would have to overrule the governing elites. This is not entirely infeasible as 
some military forces across the world serve a gatekeeper type function for democratic 
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governance (like Turkey for example). Nonetheless, some boxes in the typology are more widely 
used than others as evidenced by tables three through six which showcase the likely segments of 
the typology. 
 
 Propensity for Violence 
The propensity for violence is an important factor in any decision to alter the borders of a state. 
In Table Two below, the propensity for violence is assessed in each box.  The trend is that 
violence increases as the typology moves from left-to-right and from top-to-bottom.  In all cases, 
violence increases as the level of contestation increases shown from top-to-bottom in the 
typology.  Further, violence increases as the masses make decisions rather than the elites and 
attempts are made to secede from the periphery rather than dissolve the center, left-to-right in 
the typology.  This is a significant trend that is exposed by the categorization of the three cases 
and one that may well assist in decreasing the level of violence in conflicts across the world. 
 ***PLEASE INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE*** 
 
National Independence in Europe in the 1990s 
Soon after the collapse of Communism in 1989, the three federations of Eastern Europe all 
broke-up whereas the six remaining unitary states did not. This precluded a slew of works that 
attempted to explain this phenomenon. Bunce and found that states broke up along institutional 
lines providing independence for any large unit within the former state. 
While not necessarily evident at the time, the three federal states in Eastern Europe came 
under increasing pressures of nationalist claims whereas as the six more unitary states had less 
nationalist pressures.  Table Three below is an attempt to illustrate where nascent separatist 
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movements in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union stood in 1989. Each movement 
was, more or less, in the early stages.  However, as can be seen below, the major issue was that 
of secession, the removal of a peripheral unit from the center.  Violence was still a distinct 
possibility in all three cases even though we know now that two of the three states broke-up in 
largely peaceful ways.  In this regard, hindsight is twenty-twenty, but in reality violence was a 
very real possibility at the time.  Only through a shift in thinking could violence really be 
avoided in all three of the cases, not just Yugoslavia. 
 ***PLEASE INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE*** 
As Table Three illustrates, in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia there was minimal separatist 
contestation in 1989 (although there were increasing fears in Yugoslavia).  However, in the 
Soviet Union, the military had already been utilized especially in the Baltics to decrease some of 
the more overt nationalist agitation.  This happened despite Gorbachev’s desire to keep the peace 
and not to use military force.18  
 Furthermore, as evidenced by the shift to Table Four from Table Three, each of the states 
changes from one box on the typology to another.  It is important to note at this juncture that 
each movement was somewhat nascent at this stage but as time went on, each situation changed 
quickly.  This means that the separatist movements developed a response with regards to 
changes of the center.  As illustrated in Table Four, both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union 
dissolve when the center decides that the union is no longer viable whereas in Yugoslavia, the 
center contests the removal of regions of the periphery, albeit to different effects.  
 ***PLEASE INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE*** 
As evidenced in Table Three and Table Four, delineating between 1989 and approximately 
1995, twenty-two new states were created out of the three former states.  What then happened 
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between these years that led to the creation of all these new states?  Can their respective 
breakups tell us anything about the propensity for violence?  In this next section, I shall evaluate 
the cases in order of least violent to most violent and attempt to explain what implications can be 
drawn from the categorization laid out in the typology and why the shifts took place within the 
typology. 
 Czechoslovakia, 1993 
The cleanest of the three breakups in Eastern Europe came after the initial transition to 
democracy in the region.  Indeed, Czechoslovakia looked as if it would become the model of 
democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe after two successful elections in 1990 and 
1992.  Czechoslovakia had successfully fulfilled the minimum criterion for democracy of 
regular, free and fair elections in the aftermath of the transition.  Furthermore, with significant 
economic reforms and foreign direct investment, the country was fast becoming a suitable 
candidate for EU and NATO membership.19 
 Czechoslovakia, created in 1918 in the aftermath of World War One, was a partnership 
between two peoples: Czech and Slovak.  The Czechs had known independence historically in 
the time of the Bohemian kingdom which lasted until 1620.20  In contrast, the Slovaks, upon the 
creation of Czechoslovakia, had never been part of a political-administrative unit.21 With the 
creation of Czechoslovakia, both parties however gained independence from foreign rule. The 
Czechs were able to free themselves of Austrian rule and the Slovaks were freed of Hungarian 
control.22  This new state amalgamated the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) with 
Slovakia and Ruthenia23 to create a country that would more closely resemble national self-
determination and move away from the conceptualization of empire.   
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 Czechoslovakia, as it stood in 1989 after the Velvet Revolution ended Communist rule, 
was a country of fifteen million people split roughly on a ratio of two to one between Czechs 
and Slovaks.24  Both Czech and Slovak areas remained significantly homogenous throughout 
their seven decades together.  In line with Bunce’s argument, these two parts effectively formed 
“states in waiting.”  When Czechoslovakia then transitioned to democracy with the Velvet 
Revolution, it brought with it the same electoral setup it had under Communism.25 
Czechoslovakia had been democratic before World War Two and thus had some experience with 
democratic procedures.  However, with the nuanced bifederative system in place, it proved 
difficult to govern the country effectively. After all, the central bicameral houses, the House of 
the People and House of the Nations could easily be circumvented.  Since a three-fifths majority 
was required to enact constitutional change, each house could effectively veto any constitutional 
change with only thirty disruptive deputies.26 
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993 caused many to reflect on the 
differences between the two sides that led to the “Velvet Divorce.”27 Further, it became apparent 
even well before the beginning of the 1993 that the two sides would divorce.28  Dissolving the 
state, in a congenial manner, was less expected but the incentives from the international 
community, especially with regards to possible EU membership, helped to keep contestation to a 
minimum. 
 The case of Czechoslovakia, therefore, would fit into the upper left box of the typology: 
elite-led dissolution that was uncontested.  In the lead up to the Velvet Divorce, only 16 percent 
of the people actually supported the partition of the state29 which strongly suggests that political 
elites were responsible for driving the movement.  Moreover, since no referendum was actually 
staged, it becomes quite clear again that the elites decided the fate of Czechoslovakia.  In rare 
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incidences in the literature, academics use the term dissolution30 but almost all, at bare 
minimum, describe the removal of the center, the end of the former state and the creation of two 
new independent states even if they do not use the actual term, dissolution.  Much can be 
inferred from the use of the term dissolution because it may help to better explain the lack of 
violence.  Dissolutions that are agreed upon at the highest level may be more peaceful provided 
that neoliberal institutional safeguards such as the potential for EU and NATO membership 
exist.31  All of this upholds Migdal’s conceptualization of social control.  Violence did not break 
out in this example of dissolution even though a majority of citizens still wanted a state called 
Czechoslovakia.   
The importance of listing the Czechoslovak case as dissolution is that the prominent 
literature does not carefully consider the difference between dissolution and secession.  Even 
amongst some of the most prominent authors of the Czechoslovak dissolution, classification of 
what exactly happens is in doubt.  Young (1995), for example, considers the Czechoslovak case 
to be merely peaceful secession as it would relate to Quebec’s secessionist claims in Canada.32  
The problem, however, is that Quebecois secession is based on a peripheral territory trying to 
break with the center. Kraus and Stranger (2000) use the term dissolution in the subtitle of their 
edited volume but, throughout the book, the terms secession and dissolution are used 
interchangeably.33  In Musil’s (1995) edited volume, neither dissolution nor secession is used 
rather the term, breakup, is utilized throughout the work.34 This is, perhaps, a good explanation 
of what happened but does not provide the reader with any real substantive definition. It is also a 
very good reason as to why authors have had difficulty explaining the different levels of 
violence when examining the other cases: Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
 Soviet Union, 1991 
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The formal end of the Soviet Union came on 8 December 1991 at the Minsk Conference when 
Russia, along with Belarus and Ukraine, opted to withdraw from the union (also known as the 
Belavezah Accords).  This act effectively signaled the end of the Soviet Union which dissolved 
the state and granted full independence to union republics. Independence was granted to both 
union republics that had been agitating for it as in the Baltics and Caucasus and even to those 
that had not as in Central Asia (although the other states officially opted out of the union later in 
December 1991 with the signing of the Almaty Accords). While active separatist movements 
existed and held successful referenda on independence, they could not be considered 
independent states until the Soviet Union dissolved.35 After all, the union wide referendum on 
the continued existence of the Soviet Union supported the union in March of 1991.36  Once 
again, the Soviet case of dissolution upholds Migdal’s concept of social control.  The citizens 
accepted the outcome of the elite decision to dissolve the state even though they had voted in 
favor of it just ten months before.   
 Again, as in the Czechoslovak case, the literature falls short of adequately explaining 
precisely how the state broke up and how this influenced violence in the country.  Perhaps the 
two most prominent explanations of the Soviet breakup, Suny’s Revenge of the Past and 
Beissinger’s Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, both provide strong 
explanations of what happened.  However, in the area of categorization, both do not adequately 
show how the Soviet Union fell apart and why violence was significant in some circumstances 
and not at others.   
 Suny (1993) argues that mass-driven nationalist movements were responsible for the 
breakup of the USSR given historical allegiances that while constructed, were integral to the 
people in each of the fifteen union republics.37  This is true, to some extent, but the Soviet Union 
 18 
did not fall apart until the center dissolved.  After all, the various referenda held in the union 
republics did not grant them independence.38  If Suny’s argument is correct, therefore, the mass-
driven independence movements would have been legitimated by obtaining independence before 
Russia withdrew from the federation which effectively dissolved the Soviet Union.  This, 
however, did not happen and Suny’s argument, while clearing a lot of land, only captures part of 
the story. 
 In Beissinger (2002), the argument focuses on what seemed impossible in 1987 became 
inevitable in 1991.39  Beissinger points to a tidal wave of nationalism that became overwhelming 
and led to the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union.  This argument, in many regards, comes 
very close but does not quite encapsulate the whole story.  Indeed, as Beissinger admits, “no 
states within the world community recognized the sovereignty claims of separatist movements 
within the union republics.”40 He, therefore, like Suny, does not quite find the pivotal point at 
which mass-driven separatist movements were trumped by an elite-driven Russian dissolution 
which brought about the independence of all fifteen union republics not just those that agitated 
for independence. 
 Other authors, in line with Bunce, recognize the importance of institutions in the breakup 
of the Soviet Union. Roeder (1991) and Hale (2005), for example, both see the importance of 
institutional design in the creation of new states.  Both authors also correctly note that the Soviet 
Union broke up through dissolution rather than secession. In Roeder, the institutional setup of 
the Soviet Union precluded the dissolution of the state and became instruments of assertion.41  In 
Hale, the institutional design of the Soviet Union facilitated its dissolution which is why Russia 
has stayed together despite similar issues with ethno-federalism.42  Both provide compelling 
arguments here but their analysis of violence, however, still could be built upon further.  
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Roeder’s acknowledgment that the Soviet Union dissolved adds clout to his argument but 
he does not delineate as to when the secessionist movements were trumped by Russian led 
dissolution at the Minsk Conference.  This would help to explain some of the violence in the 
Baltics and Caucasus since numerous demonstrations were ongoing and secession was 
contested.43  However, in this line of thinking, why did violent contestation stop after December 
1991?  Dissolution, even in contested situations, is likely to be less violent than mass-driven 
secessionist movements that were increasing in size in the Baltics and elsewhere. 
Hale’s argument, differentiating between the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
continuation of Russia as a test case, is a good one.  It does not, however, have the luxury of 
viewing the Russian state over time the way scholars have been able to examine the Soviet 
Union. Simply put, it took the Soviet Union seventy-four years to dissolve, how then can we be 
sure that the same thing will not happen in Russia with only seventeen years of study?  After all, 
predictions in the social sciences can be perilous as evidenced by Gail Lapidus’ (1984) argument 
that the Soviet Union was not likely to break apart.44  Lapidus should certainly be forgiven for 
her shortcomings here as the situation changed significantly with Gorbachev’s reforms in 1986. 
Hale’s central argument that a united core region increases fears on the part of minority 
which increases separatist demands45 is correct and definitely adds to scholarly understanding 
but should better classify the differences between the Soviet Union and Russia.  It is, as Hale 
notes, a natural comparison, but a significant discussion that would add to his comparison should 
further extrapolate the relations between the center and the periphery.  The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union came from the center whereas current secessionist movements in Russia come 
from the periphery.  Hale argues the division of the core region, in some senses a synonym for 
center in this work, prevents secession.  Not so, the division of the core prevents dissolution. A 
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republic on the periphery may still, in time, secede from Russia given the right circumstances 
but the state will not likely dissolve if the core is divided.  Moreover, demographic changes 
make a significant difference such that comparing the Soviet Union, composed of 53 percent 
ethnic Russians, with Russia, composed of approximately 83 percent ethnic Russians, is more 
difficult.  The chances of dissolution given these demographic differences are much less in 
Russia because of the overwhelming demographic advantage of ethnic Russians.  Secession is, 
therefore, the more likely mode of national self-determination which can still happen especially 
if this case is viewed over time.  
 Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 
Yugoslavia, a state that came together originally as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
in 1918, was made up of six different republics and two autonomous regions.46  The country was 
relatively peaceful for much of its history despite periodic ethnic clashes and functioned, for the 
most part, normally.  It fell apart, however, in the 1990s through a mix of rising nationalism and 
fears of the other which led to numerous ethnic conflicts between some of the six republics and 
one autonomous region, Kosovo.47  As Yugoslavia edged towards war, the elites became more 
prominent in the process.  Tudjman emerged in Croatia as did Izbetgovic in Bosnia to counter 
the rhetoric of Milosevic; the center was losing social control over the territory.  This was a 
significant change and a reason why Yugoslavia shifts from the mass-driven category in 1989 
(Table Three) to the elite-driven category in 1995 (Table Four). 
One major difference between Yugoslavia and the cases of Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union was the nature of the constitutional arrangement.  Yugoslavia was much more 
confederal whereas the other two arrangements were federal.48  This essentially means that the 
republics, in theory, were supposed to have more power than the center in Yugoslavia.  Both 
 21 
federal and confederal arrangements are comparatively loose when compared to unitary or union 
states, but confederalism implies an even looser structure than federalism.  
 Another important factor within the Yugoslav conflict was the quick disintegration of the 
Yugoslav military early on in the first war in Slovenia when the forces splintered and refused to 
fight.49  The conflict, therefore, was in many ways left up to smaller paramilitary groups often 
composed of younger disenfranchised men from soccer supporters groups.50  These paramilitary 
groups fought under the direction of political elites and evidence of unofficial cooperation 
between Milosevic and Arkan’s Tigers was confirmed by a former secretary.51  In many regards, 
however, they had a great deal of autonomy with what they did, who they killed and the level of 
gruesomeness.   
 As in the cases of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the wider literature comes close 
to defining what actually happened but needs further categorization.  Yugoslavia, to be fair, is a 
difficult case given its time frame and the changes that occurred.  Categorizing everything that 
happened is difficult and there is some debate in the literature.  It is, however, important to go 
through what has been said and try to provide some clarity. 
 Bookman (1992) discusses the economic impact of secession and describes the cases of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as state unraveling.52  She argues that when more than one 
secessionist movement succeeds, the state unravels rather than classifying it, as I do, as two or 
more territories seceding.53  The reason I classify it as secession is because the center dissolved 
in the Soviet Union creating fifteen new states without the emergence of a rump Soviet Union 
(although the C.I.S. was an attempt to do so).  After Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia seceded, however, a rump Yugoslavia was left that retained this name.  While the 
name did change at a later date, the center remained in tact and the old Yugoslavia continued.  
 22 
To be fair to Bookman, she does acknowledge that her difficulty in classifying the Yugoslav 
case and furthermore her book was published before the case was finished and thus she should 
be forgiven for the ambiguity of the time. 
 Ramet (1992) on the other hand, recognizes that secession took place amongst four of the 
republics in Yugoslavia.54  The inability of the initial six republics to solve the national question 
in a de facto confederal state, in many ways, led to the secession of four republics in the early 
1990s.  Like Bookman, her issue is that it is written before the real conclusion of the conflict 
and, therefore, she is unaware of the continuation of a rump Yugoslavia after the fact and so a 
real definition of what happened still escaped her.  This is a relatively minor issue and her 
classification is still largely correct. 
 Lampe (2000) describes the dissolution of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s; something 
that was discovered later after the initial wars in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.55  The categorical 
concern with this, however, was that two republics: Serbia and Montenegro and two autonomous 
units: Vojvodina and Kosovo remained within a rump Yugoslavia until 2003 as part of an EU 
brokered deal that created the union of Serbia and Montenegro.56  Once again, categorization is 
an issue because the state did not dissolve; secession had occurred in four of the republics. 
***PLEASE INSERT TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE*** 
 Among other things, my typology delineating between the levels of contestation shows 
that a case like Yugoslavia cannot be lumped together as one state breakup.  While the four 
peripheral parts: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, each seceded 
from the center after the elites took over political leadership of the respective movements, the 
case should be much more clearly delineated.  In FYR Macedonia, the international community 
was quite concerned with war spilling over into South-East Europe and causing a wider conflict. 
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There was, therefore, an incentive for Milosevic to not contest the secession of FYR Macedonia 
which is why contestation was minimal.  In Slovenia, a brief war between Slovene forces and 
the Yugoslav military ended after only ten days culminating in a swift victory for Slovenia.57 
Milosevic’s contestation in Slovenia, therefore, was official and after the decisive Slovenian 
victory, their independence was recognized and Milosevic turned his attention to Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 Since the Yugoslav army (JNA) consisted of members from all republics, the military, as 
opposed to original design, disbanded soon into the fighting.  While the JNA did continue to 
function in some form as a Serb army, the conflicts between Milosevic and Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, were both increasingly outsourced to paramilitary groups such as Arkan’s 
Tigers.58 Arkan, as evidenced by Mazzei’s Triad Model had political support and legitimacy 
from Milosevic, economic support from the state and Serb supporters, and weapons and training 
from existing security force structures.59  This unofficial contestation allowed Milosevic to claim 
some level of impunity (albeit in theory) since much of the violence was caused by 
paramilitaries. This also provides real credence as to why Yugoslavia was so violent. 
 After Croatia’s independence was recognized in 1992 and the conflict between the rest of 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded with the Dayton Accords in 1995, a rump 
Yugoslavia still remained.  Montenegro, the last remaining republic outside of Serbia began 
agitating for independence.  In 2002, after several years of Montenegrin agitation, the EU-
brokered Belgrade Agreement placed a moratorium on a potential Montenegrin referendum for 
three years and changed the name of the state from Yugoslavia to the union of Serbia and 
Montenegro.60 
The Dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro, 2006 
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The dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 brought to a close the ongoing the dispute 
between the two remaining republics of rump Yugoslavia.  While it may be argued that 
Montenegro held a referendum and seceded as a peripheral territory from Serbia and the 
autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the actual outcome of the Montenegrin 
referendum was not fully resolved until both Montenegro and Serbia declared their respective 
independence in early June 2006.61  In fact, Serbia declared independence two days after 
Montenegro thus legitimizing the dissolution of the union.  This provided a much more peaceful 
outcome for two reasons.  First, the EU monitored the election and required that Montenegrin 
support exceed fifty-five percent which, while somewhat arbitrary, was expected to keep the 
peace.62  Second, the Serbian military, when gauging the morale of their troops, opted not to 
wage a violent war against Montenegro.63  The dissolution of the state, therefore, allowed Serbia 
and Montenegro to divide peacefully despite the constant fear of violence in the Balkans.  
 While the case of Montenegrin independence, by some, may be argued as a case of 
secession, the dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro has much in common with Norway-Sweden in 
1905.64  The breakup had much more legitimacy and was not contested because it was a 
mutually agreed upon dissolution rather than a disputed secession. In the case of Norway, after 
entering into a personal union with Sweden in 1814 albeit with significant resistance, the 
Norwegians had significant autonomy.65  However, with the establishment of a more true 
democratic system in 1884, the Norwegians increasingly agitated for independence. In 1905, 
they held a referendum which received overwhelming support.66 This, however, did not 
legitimate their independence which only came after the Swedes agreed to let them go.  In this 
era, the Swedes were a much more aggressive people and had fought wars in the nineteenth 
century.  Likewise, when Montenegro held a referendum in 2006, it was legitimated by a 
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successful vote and some recognition in the international community but it was not until Serbia 
recognized Montenegro that the UN allowed for their membership and full independence. In this 
way, the union was peacefully dissolved and Serbia-Montenegro was replaced by two 
independent states: Serbia and Montenegro. This can be contrasted with the secession of Kosovo 
that has had significant contestation and the final outcome is not yet clear at the time of writing. 
***PLEASE INSERT TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE*** 
The case of Montenegro, therefore, as Table Six shows, outlines how an elite-driven dissolution 
with minimal contestation led to little violence even in the fissiparous Balkans region. Through 
international incentives, dissolution became possible and while it may be true that Serb troops 
had little morale in 2000, paramilitary groups may have stepped in and violence could still have 
ensued. 
Conclusion 
The breakups of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia showcase how states that are 
similar in many ways can diverge so greatly in the nature of their breakups and the level of 
violence associated with them.  My typology is an attempt to explain these phenomena and 
presents a way to think systematically about breakups.   
Bunce (1999a, 1999b, 2004) argues that the three breakups in Eastern Europe occurred 
along ethnofederal lines and were resultant of subversive institutions.67  In this way she cleared a 
lot of land.  This paper builds on that foundation to explore in greater depth the variations across 
their experiences, including sub-cases within the former Yugoslavia, especially in the lens of 
violence accompanying the breakups.  It does so by examining these variables: whether the 
dismemberment was the result of dissolution or secession, whether it was elite or mass-driven 
and whether and how it was contested.  This paper finds that state dissolution produces more 
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peaceful outcomes than the secession of a territory on the periphery. Moreover, mass-driven 
separatism and unofficial contestation through the use of a paramilitary forces increase the level 
of violence during a contentious state breakup.  The conceptual approach in the paper is 
generalizable and will help understand and limit conflict around the world, especially in 
scenarios where territory is contested and the breakup of a state is likely. 
This paper, therefore, has wide ranging implications. Not only is it important to 
European conflicts, it can be used in cases throughout the world.  Furthermore, as the case of 
Yugoslavia elucidates, a given conflict can last for considerable time and should be thought of as 
sub-cases if the conflict continues in the long term, piecing together past conflicts if necessary.  
This paper also makes a definitional amendment to Bunce’s work on subversive institutions, 
upholds Migdal’s concept of social control, and advances in a small way Mazzei’s work on 
paramilitary group emergence.   
Perhaps the most overarching contribution of this paper is to further discuss elite-driven 
dissolution.  Dissolving a state is not a good outcome under normal circumstances.  However, in 
situations where the political conflict is becoming more like a zero-sum violent conflict, the 
option of dissolution may cauterize some conflicts outright and even help to reduce violence 
where widespread conflict was expected.  If nothing else, it will give the respective parties one 
more option at the negotiating table.  
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Table One: A Typology of Violence and State breakups 
 Elite-driven 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation  
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state and 
becomes a set 
of completely 
new entities 
through an elite 
led movement 
which is 
uncontested by 
the various parts 
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state and 
becomes a set 
of completely 
new entities 
which is 
uncontested by 
the various parts 
 
-The periphery 
attempts to break 
away from the 
center with little 
contestation 
 
-The periphery 
attempts to 
break away 
from the center 
with little 
contestation 
 
Official 
Contestation 
(Army) 
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state but the 
army steps in to 
stop this from 
happening 
thereby 
disobeying the 
elites 
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state but the 
army steps in to 
stop this from 
happening 
thereby 
disobeying the 
elites, on 
account of 
mass-led 
demonstrations 
-The periphery 
attempts to break 
away from the 
center but is 
contested by the 
army controlled 
by the center 
-The periphery 
attempts to 
break away 
from the center 
but is contested 
by the army 
controlled by 
the center 
Unofficial 
Contestation 
(Paramilitary) 
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state but rogue 
elements within 
the state fight 
for its survival 
-The center opts 
to dissolve the 
state but rogue 
elements within 
the state fight 
for its survival 
usually from 
amongst the 
masses 
-The periphery 
attempts to 
secede from the 
center disbands 
the military 
given the 
heterogeneous 
nature of the 
state so the 
center creates a 
paramilitary to 
contest the 
secessionist 
movement 
-The periphery 
attempts to 
secede from 
the center 
disbands the 
military given 
the 
heterogeneous 
nature of the 
state so the 
center creates a 
paramilitary to 
contest the 
secessionist 
movement 
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Table Two: Levels of Violence in the Typology 
 Elite-driven 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation 
-Minimal 
violence 
-Minimal 
violence 
-Minimal 
violence but 
agitation could 
occur between 
laypersons  
-Violence is 
more likely 
given the nature 
of mass-led 
movements and, 
therefore, 
clashes between 
rival groups are 
increasingly 
likely 
Official 
Contestation 
(Military) 
-Minimal 
violence given 
the instruction 
of political 
elites 
-Minimal 
violence given 
the instruction 
of political 
elites 
-The military 
challenges the 
seceding party 
and violence 
erupts 
-The military 
challenges the 
seceding party 
and violence 
erupts 
Unofficial 
Contestation 
(Paramilitary)  
-Some violence 
could occur in a 
hypothetical 
situation but is 
unlikely 
-Some violence 
could occur in a 
hypothetical 
situation but is 
unlikely 
-Heavy violence 
is likely as the 
government 
outsources its 
violence to 
paramilitary 
groups who 
have limited 
accountability 
-Heavy violence 
in a situation 
that is now 
anarchical, 
paramilitary 
activities are 
rampant and 
heavy casualties 
are inflicted  
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Table Three: Eastern Europe, circa 1989 
 Elite-driven 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation  
  -Czechoslovakia: 
Some very minor 
Slovak agitation 
-Yugoslavia: 
Increased fears 
from Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia 
and Macedonia 
with regards to 
Milosevic’s 
overtures 
Official 
Contestation 
   -Soviet Union: 
Significant 
secessionist 
agitation in the 
Baltics, Georgia 
and the Ukraine 
Unofficial 
Contestation  
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Table Four: Eastern Europe, circa 1995 
 
 Elite-drive 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation  
-Czechoslovakia: 
split into Czech 
and Slovak 
Republics 
peacefully 
 
-Soviet Union: 
Russia withdraws 
from the Soviet 
Union thus 
dissolving the 
center and 
granting 
independence to 
the fifteen union 
republics 
 -Macedonia: 
Due to 
international 
constraints, 
Macedonia is 
granted 
independence 
with minimal 
contestation 
 
Official 
Contestation 
  -Slovenia: The 
Yugoslav army 
contests the 
secession of 
Slovenia but 
loses a quick 
war and allows 
for their 
secession 
 
Unofficial 
Contestation 
  -Yugoslavia: 
Croatia and 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
both become 
independent 
after significant 
conflicts 
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Table Five: Clarifying the Yugoslav breakup 
 
 Elite-driven 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation  
  -Macedonia: 
Due to 
international 
constraints, 
Macedonia is 
granted 
independence 
with minimal 
contestation 
 
Official 
Contestation 
  -Slovenia: The 
Yugoslav army 
contests the 
secession of 
Slovenia but 
loses a quick 
war and allows 
for their 
secession 
 
Unofficial 
Contestation 
  -Yugoslavia: 
Croatia and 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
both become 
independent 
after significant 
conflicts 
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Table Six: The Dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro, 2006 
 Elite-driven 
Dissolution 
Mass-driven 
Dissolution 
Elite-driven 
Secession 
Mass-driven 
Secession 
Minimal 
Contestation  
-Serbia and 
Montenegro: 
After a 
successful 
referendum in 
Montenegro and 
a declaration of 
independence, 
the Serbs 
capitulate, 
declare 
independence 
themselves and 
allow for the 
dissolution of 
the union 
   
Official 
Contestation 
    
Unofficial 
Contestation 
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